# New 1ac

## Notes

#### Broke new manufacturing scenario

## Manufacturing

#### TTIP agreement talks between the US and EU are coming

EC 7/12/13 – (“EU and US conclude first round of TTIP negotiations in Washington”, European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941)//javi

The first week-long round of talks for an EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) comes to a closure today in Washington. “It’s been a very productive week”, said EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia-Bercero coming out of the talks. “We have been striving already for many months to prepare the ground for an ambitious trade and investment deal that will boost the transatlantic economy, delivering jobs and growth for both European and Americans. This week we have been able to take this negotiation to the next step. The main objective has been met: we had a substantive round of talks on the full range of topics that we intend to cover in this agreement. This paves the way to for a good second round of negotiations in Brussels in October.” Working throughout the week, the negotiating groups have set out respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the TTIP - the biggest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken - is set to cover. They included: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-owned enterprises. Negotiators identified certain areas of convergence across various components of the negotiation and - in areas of divergence – begun to explore possibilities to bridge the gaps. The talks have been based on a thorough review of the stakeholders views expressed to date. The negotiators met also in the middle of the week with approximately 350 stakeholders from academia, trade unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations to listen to formal presentations and answer questions related to the proposed agreement.

#### US should invite Mexico to EU-US partnership

Siekierski 3/15/13 – (BJ, “Is Mexico looking for NAFTA-EU trade talks?”, iPolitics, <http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/03/15/is-mexico-looking-for-nafta-eu-trade-talks/>)//javi

“It seems really logical to us that this be a trilateral negotiation and that Mexico join,” Minister Guajardo was quoted as saying, in Spanish, by a prominent Mexican business newspaper, El Financiero, Wednesday. Though Mexico already has an agreement with the European Union — which came into force in 2000 — the El Financiero article says Mexican and European authorities have agreed to strengthen it. Rather than negotiate simultaneously with the Americans, therefore, the idea would be to bring both negotiations under one roof. And since Canada is a fellow NAFTA partner, common sense would dictate Canadian involvement as well. With the EU and U.S. aiming to begin their Transatlantic talks in June, Guajardo indicated that Mexico would be “formally petitioning” the EU President and Barack Obama to make it a NAFTA-EU negotiation, El Financiero reported.

#### Mexico needs to be included – expands trade and development of common standards

Negroponte 5/2/13 – Diana Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative under Foreign Policy at Brookings. She focuses on Latin America and researches and writes about the New Left, populism and the relationship between criminal gangs and state institutions. Negroponte is editor of The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition Ph.D., Georgetown University J.D., American University B.S. Econ, London School of Economics & Political Science (Diana Villiers, “Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/02-obama-mexico-trip-trade-investment-negroponte)//javi

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies. Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity. The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

#### Trade declines if Mexico is not included

Felbermayr et. al. 13 – (“Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from a free trade deal?”, GED, http://www.ged-shorts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Study-TTIP\_final\_ENG.pdf)//javi

Table 7 examines the changes in trade in North America and between the USA and the BRICS. A few important insights are striking. First, TTIP leads to trade diversion effects within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between USA, Mexico and Canada. In the comprehensive liberalization scenario, both exports and imports decline for NAFTA partner countries within the region. The two NAFTA countries whose position is not improved by TTIP, Mexico and Canada, intensify their trade. That is an impressive example of trade diversion effects between countries not directly affected in anyway by TTIP: The access of these countries especially to the US market becomes less attractive due to increased competition from the EU, leading to a substantial rise in trade between them. What makes this effect so strong is that the trade barriers, as we know, between Mexico and Canada have already been eliminated. Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of trade between the EU and Canada. Geographic circumstances are decisive for this result. Because of its closeness to the USA, Canada is especially affected by trade diversion effects involving the USA. This effect leads to creating trade with the EU countries that are geographically farther away, so that transport costs are lower, and the change in the relative cost structures leads to replacement of the American market with the EU. This circumstance means that finalization of an agreement between the EU and Canada, currently under negotiation, would strengthen the trade of the countries involved with each other but not eliminate the negative trade diversion effects.

#### Exclusion of Mexico hurts trade partnership

BFNA 6/17/13 – (“US, EU Benefit Significantly From TTIP”, Bertelsmann Foundation, http://www.bfna.org/article/us-eu-benefit-significantly-from-ttip)//javi

WASHINGTON, DC/GUETERSLOH, GERMANY (June 17, 2013) - The US and all EU member countries would benefit significantly from a comprehensive trade pact, according to "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal?", an ifo Institute study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation. A TTIP that eliminates non-tariff trade barriers and tariffs would boost per capita GDP and employment on both sides of the Atlantic but impose losses on much of the rest of the world. The US would achieve the greatest growth from a TTIP, with long-term per capita GDP climbing 13.4 percent. EU member states would, on average, see five-percent growth in long-term per capita GDP. The United Kingdom would be Europe’s biggest beneficiary; its long-term per capita GDP would rise 9.7 percent. Other EU member countries that would profit more than average from a far-reaching liberalization of trade include small export-oriented economies, such as those of the Baltic states, and crisis-ridden southern European countries. The large economies of Germany and France would benefit less than the EU average from a comprehensive free-trade agreement. Long-term German per capita GDP would increase 4.7 percent; the comparative French figure is 2.6 percent. Intensified trade relations between the US and the EU would decrease their imports from the rest of the world. As a result, long-term per capital GDP would drop 9.5 percent in Canada and 7.2 percent in Mexico. Japan would also see a fall, of 5.9 percent. Additional losers would include developing countries, especially those in Africa and central Asia.

#### US-Mexico trade key to resolve Mexican instability and manufacturing sector

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permanently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all. Recently, talk about a mega-agreement on trade between the world’s biggest trading bloc—the European Union—and the United States has surfaced. But it is not clear at all that this would hurt Mexico; it already has its own trade agreement with the EU and, on the other hand, there may be incentives to extend the EU-U.S. trade agreement to include other countries.

#### US is an integral part of Mexican manufacturing industry

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### US free trade is key to Mexican manufacturing and aerospace

Ryder 10 – (“Mexico Takes Flight”, Inbound Logistics, June 2010, http://www.ryder.com/en/supply-chain/solutions-by-industry/~/media/Ryder/Files/KnowledgeCenter/WhitePapers/RSC345Mexico%20Takes%20FlightIBLLowResEprintsingle.pdf)//javi

Among the many attractions that draw aerospace companies to Mexico, the cost of labor is a major factor. Highly skilled workers in Mexico’s aerospace industry earn from $5.80 to $7.80 an hour. Mexico is the lowest-cost choice for U.S. companies that outsource manufacturing abroad, surpassing India, China, and Vietnam, according to a report released this year by AlixPartners. Companies can easily ship products and components to Mexico from their plants in the United States or Canada for final assembly, or ship finished products to customers throughout North America. “You’re talking hours and days, rather than weeks, for transit to the United States,” says Jim Moore, vice president of sales for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “You can ship on Thursday morning by truck and deliver on Monday.” Having targeted aerospace as a strategic growth industry, the Mexican government is doing its best to make the country an attractive environment for this sector. One of the most important incentives is the maquila system, which has prompted many North American manufacturers, in a variety of industries, to “nearshore” their production in Mexico. Maquilas are factories that operate in free trade zones. Companies import materials and equipment to those locations without paying taxes or duties, then reexport the finished products. Often, the manufactured goods are components that are shipped to factories outside Mexico for final assembly in products such as aircraft, automobiles, and computers. But even outside the maquila zones, parts and materials for use in aerospace manufacturing enjoy special tariff treatment, entering the country duty-free, says Ricardo Alvarez, director of business development for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “Also, the value-added tax (VAT) is refundable after five days of the import process,” he notes. Mexico’s federal and state governments have established a variety of other tax incentives for the aerospace industry. In fact, from 2006 to 2008–a time when Mexico had eliminated incentives for many manufacturing sectors–it retained its incentives for aerospace. These included capital equipment grants, help with infrastructure, real estate grants, and the establishment of an Aerospace Training Center in Querétaro. FEMIA, an association of 48 aerospace manufacturers operating in Mexico, works with the federal and state governments to promote the interests of the industry. One of FEMIA’s goals is to develop a National Strategic Aerospace Plan.

#### Mexican aerospace is key to US aerospace investments

Taylor 13 (Guy, “Aerospace: An Emerging Mexican Industry”, Americas Quarterly, Winter, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/aerospace-emerging-mexican-industry)

What began as an initial push into Mexico by U.S. manufacturers such as General Electric during the years following the 1994 enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement has now emerged as one of the nation’s most vibrant sectors. With 30,000 Mexicans now employed in aerospace factories across 16 of the nation’s 31 states, Mexican government investment in the sector is also growing—most measurably through the establishment of training schools and new university programs aimed at delivering a future crop of homegrown aerospace workers, plant managers and possibly even designers. The nation graduated more engineers per capita than Germany in 2012. While the states of Querétaro and Baja California make up the majority of aerospace production in Mexico, recent developments in Chihuahua City deserve a closer look. Ford Motor Company opened a factory in 1983 and has since built nearly 7 million truck engines. Thirty-six aerospace parts factories have opened in Chihuahua City over the past five years. A recent reporting trip there revealed that the vast majority of the factories are not Mexican-owned—which makes Mexico’s aerospace market unique in the hemisphere. The downside of this is that the country may be used increasingly for its cheap labor by profit-hungry companies from more established markets. But the upside finds Mexico emerging as a new center of globalization. A variety of international companies have recently opened new plants in Chihuahua City: U.S.-based supplier Nordam, which makes everything from airplane windows to cockpit doors; France-based Manior Aerospace, which cuts shiny precision-shaped steel discs that end up on Boeing commercial jets; and Netherlands-based Fokker Technologies.

#### Aerospace decline causes global instability and great power war

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

Deterrence Strategy In stark contrast to the bipolar Cold War nuclear setting, today’s security environment includes multiple, independent nuclear actors. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversaries, some are rivals, and some are friends, but the initial decision for action by any one of them may lie beyond U.S. control. The United States may need to influence, signal, and restrain enemies, and it may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and allies. America may also face catalytic warfare, where, for example, a U.S. ally such as Israel or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Although the United States would not be a party to the nuclear escalation decision process, it could be drawn into the conflict. Compared to a bipolar world, very little is known about strategic nuclear interaction and escalation in a multipolar world. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of actors today than during the Cold War. This requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to address specific challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurance sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic warfare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation. America may also need simultaneously to deter more than one other nuclear state. Deterrence requirements include four critical elements: early warning, C2, delivery systems, and weapons. The Air Force plays an indispensable role in furnishing the U.S. early warning system in its entirety through satellites and radar networks. In command and control, infrastructure is provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems and weapons, two-thirds of the strategic triad – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers – is furnished by the Air Force and its Global Strike Command. U.S. Overseas Basing and the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threat The increased availability of anti-access/area-denial assets coupled with growing threats to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace commons are challenging the power projection capabilities of the United States. These threats, in the form of aircraft and long-range missiles carrying conventional or nuclear munitions, present problems for our overseas bases. States such as North Korea, China, and Iran jeopardize the notion that forward-deployed U.S. forces and bases will be safe from enemy attack. Consequently, the United States must create a more flexible basing structure encompassing a passive and active defense posture that includes these features: dispersal, hardening, increased warning time of attack, and air defenses. Simultaneously, the United States must continue to develop long-range, offensive systems such as low-observable manned and remotely piloted strike aircraft, precision missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to penetrate heavily defended A2/AD environments. This approach will increase the survivability of U.S. forward-deployed assets and power projection capabilities and thus bolster deterrence and U.S. guarantees to America’s allies and friends. Asymmetric Challenges The increasing number of actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use technologies augments the potential for asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies by those who are unable to match U.S. military capabilities. Those actors pose increasing challenges to the ability of the United States to project power through the global commons. Such attacks could target specific U.S. vulnerabilities, ranging from space assets to the financial, transportation, communications, and/or energy infrastructures, and to the food and water supply, to mention only the most obvious. Asymmetric attacks denying access to critical networks and capabilities may be the most cost-effective approach to circumventing traditional U.S. force advantages. The USAF and DoD must develop systems and technologies that can offset and defend against asymmetric capabilities. This will require a robust R&D program and enhanced USAF cooperation with its sister services and international partners and allies. Space Dominance Space is increasingly a contested domain where U.S. dominance is no longer assured given the growing number of actors in space and the potential for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, including ASAT weapons, EMP, and jamming. As a result, the United States must protect vital space-based platforms and networks by reducing their vulnerability to attack or disruption and increasing the country’s resilience if an attack does occur. Required steps include hardening and incorporating stealth into next generation space systems and developing rapid replenishment capacity (including micro-satellite technologies and systems and new launch capabilities). At the same time, America must reduce its dependence on space capabilities with air-based substitutes such as high altitude, long endurance, and penetrating ISR platforms. Increased cooperation among the services and with U.S. allies to develop such capabilities will also be paramount. Cyber Security Cyber operations are vital to conducting USAF and joint land, sea, air, and space missions. Given the significance of the cyber threat (private, public, and DoD cyber and information networks are routinely under attack), the United States is attempting to construct a layered and robust capability to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions and attacks. The USAF’s cyber operations must be capable of operating in a contested cyber domain to support vital land, sea, air, and space missions. USAF cyberspace priorities include developing capabilities to protect essential military cyber systems and to speed their recovery if an attack does occur; enhancing the Air Force’s capacity to provide USAF personnel with the resolution of technical questions; and training/recruitment of personnel with cyber skills. In addition, the USAF and DoD need to develop technologies that quickly and precisely attribute attacks in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can spread quickly among networks, making it extremely difficult to attribute their perpetrator, and therefore to develop a deterrence strategy based on retaliation. In addition, some cyber issues are in the legal arena, including questions about civil liberties. It is likely that the trend of increased military support to civil authorities (for example, in disaster relief operations) will develop in the cyber arena as well. These efforts will entail greater service, interagency, international, and private-sector collaboration. Organizational Change and Joint Force Operations To address growing national security challenges and increasing fiscal constraints, and to become more effective, the joint force needs to adapt its organizations and processes to the exigencies of the information age and the security setting of the second decade of the twenty-first century. This entails developing a strategy that places increased emphasis on joint operations in which each service acts in greater concert with the others, leverages capacities across the services (two land services, three naval services, and five air services) without duplicating efforts, and encourages interoperability. This would provide combatant commanders (CCDRs) with a greater range of capabilities, allowing heightened flexibility to use force. A good example of this approach is the Air-Sea Battle concept being developed jointly by the Air Force and Navy, which envisions heightened cooperation between the two services and potentially with allies and coalition partners. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities There is an increasing demand for ISR capabilities able to access and persist in contested airspace in order to track a range of high-value mobile and hard-to-find targets, such as missile launchers and underground bunkers. This increases the need for stealthy, survivable systems and the development of next-generation unmanned platforms. The USAF must continue to emphasize precision targeting, both for strike and close-air-support missions. High-fidelity target identification and discrimination enabled by advanced radars and directed-energy systems, including the ability to find, track, and target individuals within a crowd, will provide battlefield commanders with improved options and new opportunities for leveraging joint assets. Engagement and International Security Cooperation Allies and coalition partners bring important capabilities from which the USAF and other services have long benefited. For example, allies and coalition partners can provide enhanced situational awareness and early warning of impending crises as well as assist in understanding the interests, motivations, traditions, and cultures of potential adversaries and prospective coalition partners. Moreover, foreign partner engagement and outreach are an avenue to influence partner and adversary perspectives, thus shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. national security interests. Engagement also may be a key to realizing another Air Force and joint priority: to sustain or gain access to forward operating bases and logistical infrastructure. This is particularly important given the growing availability of A2/AD assets and their ability to impede U.S. power projection capabilities. Procurement Choices and Affordability The USAF needs to field capabilities to support current operations and pressing missions while at the same time pursuing promising technologies to build the force of the future. Affordability, effectiveness, time urgency, and industrial base issues inevitably shape procurement choices and reform. The Air Force must maintain today’s critical assets while also allocating resources to meet future needs. Given the long lifespan anticipated for many weapon systems, planners need to make the most reliable cost estimates and identify problems at the outset of a weapons system’s development phase so that they can be corrected as early and cost-effectively as possible. Support to Civil Authorities As evidenced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile (the Chile earthquake hit after this conference), the USAF has a vital role to play in the U.S. response to international relief operations and support to civil authorities. In Haiti, the USAF reopened the airport and deployed contingency response elements, while also providing ISR support for the joint forces in the theater. In Chile, USAF satellite communication capabilities were critical to the recovery and relief efforts. USAF civil support roles are likely to grow to include greater use of the Reserve Components. Consequently, USAF planners should reassess the active and reserve component mix of forces and capabilities to identify potential mobilization and requirement shortfalls. CLOSING CONFERENCE THOUGHTS A recurring conference theme was the need for the USAF to continue to examine specific issues of opportunity and vulnerability more closely. For example, a future initiative could include focused working groups that would examine such questions and issues as: • How can air, space, and cyberspace capabilities best support deterrence, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and support national objectives? • How should the USAF leadership reconceptualize its vision, institutional identity, and force posture to align as closely as possible with the future national security setting? • What is the appropriate balance between high-end and low-end air and space capabilities that will maximize military options for national decision makers, given emerging threats and fiscal constraints? • What are the opportunities, options, and tradeoffs for investment and divestment in science and technology, infrastructure, and programmed capabilities? • What are additional interdependent concepts, similar to Air-Sea Battle, that leverage cross-service investments to identify and foster the development of new joint capabilities? • What are alternative approaches to officer accessions and development to support shifting and emerging Air Force missions, operations, and force structure, including cyber warfare? • How can the USAF best interact with Congress to help preserve or refocus the defense-industrial base as well as to minimize mandates and restrictions that weigh on future Air Force investments? Finally, the USAF must continue to be an organization that views debate, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it in his opening conference address, “…as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our strategic thinking.” This debate must also be used in pursuit of political support and to ensure that the USAF maintains and develops critical capabilities to support U.S. national security priorities. The 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy was conceived as a contribution to that debate. Almost a century has passed since the advent of airpower and Billy Mitchell’s demonstration of its operational potential with the sinking of the Ostfriesland on July 21, 1921. For most of that time, the United States has benefitted from the rapid development of air and space power projection capabilities, and, as a result, it has prevailed in successive conflicts, contributed to war deterrence and crisis management, and provided essential humanitarian relief to allies and friends around the world. As we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), like its service counterparts, is re-assessing strategies, operational concepts, and force structure. Across the conflict spectrum, security challenges are evolving, and potential adversaries–state and non-state actors–are developing anti-access and other asymmetric capabilities, and irregular warfare challenges are becoming more prevalent. The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airman who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables? • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments? • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula

What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Statistics prove heg is effective

**Owen 11** [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

#### Sustaining improvements in manufacturing key to re-shoring production

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Driven by a series of global developments and technological advances, a manufacturing renaissance is taking hold in the United States and Mexico that is increasing the competitiveness of regional industry and the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade. After many companies moved their factories to Asia in search of cheap wages over the past two decades, new trends are pulling production facilities back to North America. While manufacturing wages in China were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past decade’s movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs and shipping times; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences; contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world, particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis-à-vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3 New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long-range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider near-shoring in Mexico or re-shoring their production back to the United States. Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination.

#### North American near-shoring focuses Chinese manufacturing on the domestic market and growing Asian economies

Sirkin et al. 11 — Harold L. Sirkin, senior partner and managing director in the Chicago office of The Boston Consulting Group and the author of GLOBALITY: Competing with Everyone from Everywhere for Everything, and Michael Zinser, partner and managing director in the firm’s Chicago office, and Douglas Hohner, partner and managing director in BCG’s Chicago office (Harold L. Sirkin, Michael Zinser, Douglas Hohner, *The Boston Consulting Group*, “Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S.”, August 2011, <http://www.bcg.com/documents/file84471.pdf>, Accessed 07-22-2013 | AK)

The reallocation of production is still in its early stages, but we believe it will accelerate in the years ahead. The impact of the changing cost equation will vary from industry to industry. Products in which labor accounts for a small portion of total costs and in which volumes are modest, such as auto parts, construction equipment, and appliances, will be among those that companies reevaluate in terms of their options for supplying the North American market. But the manufacture of goods with relatively higher labor content that are produced in high volumes will likely remain in China. Finally, companies that make mass-produced, labor-intensive products, like apparel and shoes, may move production from China to other low-cost nations. (We will assess the implications of the new manufacturing math for specific industries in the second report in this series.) These trends do not suggest that Chinese manufacturing will decline or that multinational companies will shut their mainland plants. More Chinese production capacity will be devoted to supplying the country’s enormous domestic market, which is gaining millions of new middle-class households each year, as well as other growing economies in Asia. In addition, China will continue to remain a low-cost supplier to Western Europe. And China will remain competitive in industries that have developed strong “clusters of excellence” and that have an immense installed base of production capacity and component and material suppliers. This means that when it comes to building new production capacity, companies will likely choose to explore alternatives instead of automatically opting for China. Over the next five years, we believe that the U.S. will be the optimal choice for many manufacturing investments aimed at serving the North American market.

#### That solves great power Asia war

Auslin 09 (Michael, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2009, “Averting Disaster Preventing the worst case scenario in Asia”, 2-5, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/115jtnqw.asp?page=2>)

AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past.

## Plan

#### The United States federal government ought to include the United Mexican States in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

## Contention 2 - EU Relations

#### Negotiations with Mexico are necessary to the success of TTIP

Knigge 2/26/13 – (Michael, “EU-US trade deal is 'unique opportunity'”, DW, http://www.dw.de/eu-us-trade-deal-is-unique-opportunity/a-16584523?maca=en-rss-en-top-1022-rdf)//javi

Experts are skeptical as to whether such an agreement can ever be reached. They point to similar visions of free, transatlantic trade from the past that fizzled out in the political chambers of Washington and Brussels. After the multi-year and ultimately fruitless worldwide trade deal called the Doha Development Agenda failed in 2008, Washington is also tired of endless discussion. In order to gauge the seriousness of Europeans on the matter, the Obama administration has recently been anxious for a clear signal from Brussels. Yet even if the EU and US begin negotiations in the coming months, success is anything but assured. Negotiators from both the US government and the EU Commission will not be free to negotiate as they please. Without the ultimate approval of US Congress and the EU Parliament, there will be no agreement. Other countries, such as Turkey, which has a customs agreement with the EU, or Canada and Mexico, which are linked to US trade through NAFTA, will at the very least have to play an informal role in future negotiations.

#### TTIP failure hurts US-EU trade ties and relations

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

Yet even if it fails – and there are plenty who think that the obstacles such as agriculture and, most recently, data privacy are insurmountable – a failure would be pivotal, showing that tariffs can be dropped but non-tariff barriers, which are often more cultural in nature, remain stubborn. A failure, says Fredrik Erixon, the director of the European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, “could lead to a larger standstill in efforts to address 21st century trade barriers.” Long-standing obstacles Tariffs between the US and EU are already relatively low, but because of the sheer size of trade between the two – representing half of global economic output – advocates say it would be a major booster of growth and jobs, especially in debt-stricken Europe that has seen record high unemployment at 12.2 percent. The two already invest nearly $4 trillion in each other’s economies, according to US statistics, which translates into 7 million jobs. It’s the non-tariff barriers, however, that most are watching in TTIP talks. Today, if a product is made in France, for example, it goes through the various regulatory hurdles to bring it to the marketplace; it then has to go through another set of strenuous – and often redundant – hurdles to reach the US market. Under the TTIP, both sides could agree to mutually recognize the others’ systems. When it comes to car safety, reducing red tape may be an easy compromise. But other issues on the table have long vexed negotiators. That includes French subsidies for its film industry, European resistance to genetically modified foods (GMOs), or data privacy laws – especially in the wake of the information released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealing the US systematically spies on its own citizens, as well as European institutions. “One of the sleeper issues in the deal is how to deal with privacy,” says Bruce Stokes, the director of the Global Economic Attitudes program at the Pew Research Center. Europeans, particularly Germans, are far more sensitive than Americans when it comes to data privacy. “There is a disconnect between Europeans and Americans about this new digital economy,” Mr. Stokes says. And even if the Snowden case is about government, not industry, it bolsters European assumptions that Americans don’t care about privacy, he says. Supporters of the agreement know these talks will be arduous, but at a time of economic weakness, they might have the political will to push forward. “Europe is stuck, and the US is also stuck, although not quite as bad,” says Thomas Wright, a fellow in the Managing Global Order project at the Brookings Institution. “This offers a way that leaders can be proactive and generate growth. I think that resonates with people, particularly in Europe.” Mr. Erixon also says that regulators in specific industries have more of an incentive to find solutions now, because their refusal to compromise would influence every other industry included in the talks. On the issue of the US using chlorine when washing chicken, for example, compromise has been impossible because the context was always too small. “Regulators were trying to defend their position, with no interest at all in participating in negotiations with other countries,” he says. “If you play filibuster now, the cost is higher.” 'Cultural exceptions' – and similarities So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate. “It’s not a little issue. It’s the cultural meat of a nation,” says Josef Braml, transatlantic expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, who has little hope that a deal is attainable – above all, he says, because of the weakness of President Obama. But the “cultural exception” debate could be a harbinger of sentiments that develop as the trade talks get underway. Guillaume Xavier-Bender of the German Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels says that in many ways the talks will show how similar regulations between Europe and the US are. “There are more things in common between Europeans and Americans than there are differences,” he says. But on the politically most sensitive issues, claims that TTIP is merely an American instrument to change European values could be made. “It is possible in Europe you see anti-globalization and anti-liberalization movements evolve into anti-Americanism,” he says. If an agreement becomes impossible to forge, it may ultimately illustrate more than transatlantic differences. Mr. Stokes says that global economies have continuously become more closely integrated over time. But if in the TTIP it’s possible to get rid of tariffs yet not non-tariff barriers, he says it will be telling for the future of trade agreements globally – a sign, he says, that “we may be encountering the edges of the limits of globalization.”

#### EU says yes

COG 3/3/08 – (Bob Thiel, “A Combined EU & North American Trade Block Coming?”, Church of God News, http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/a-combined-eu-north-american-trade-block-coming/)//javi

Fifty-five U.S. Senators and Congressman currently serve as advisors to a “working group” for the Transatlantic Common Market between the U.S. and the European Union. “An economist from the World Bank has argued in print that the formation of the Transatlantic Common Market is designed to follow the blueprint of Jean Monet, a key intellectual architect of the European Union, recognizing that economic integration must inevitably lead to political integration.” The idea of this union came to light in April 2007, when President Bush, German Chancellor Merkel, and European Commission President Barroso launched the Transatlantic Economic Council. Efforts are already underway to create a North American Community, including the U.S., Mexico and Canada. This community is to be based on security and economic issues and is intended to be in place by 2010 (WorldNetDaily.com, July 20, 2005; September 25, 2006). The Transatlantic Common Market is intended to combine the North American Community with the EU, creating the world’s most formidable trade bloc—a trade bloc that would be so large that its trading policies would automatically become policies for the world. Plans for this new “common market” are proceeding and are intended to pass through in a “treaty” form, much like the most recent EU Treaty, in order to avoid the scrutiny and debate that often come with more “formal” agreements (January 16, 2008). Revelation 18 warns of a future Beast, known as Babylon the Great, through which “the merchants of the earth have become rich through the abundance of her luxury” (v. 3). I have been expecting such a development for some time. And today, I would like to explain what I have believed for over 20 years will most likely happen with the above proposed trade block. Negotiations will continue and some type of loose agreements will happen. In the spirit of accommodation and personal interest, many of the “standards” of the European Union will be adopted by the USA, Canada and Mexico, as well as by nearly all of the countries of the world. The Arab nations will most likely agree with many of the standards as they seem to be destined to form a brief end-time alliance with the Europeans (The Arab World In the Bible, History, and Prophecy).

#### Decline in US-EU relations causes Protectionism

C. Fred Bergsten 99, Director, Institute for International Economics, “America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 78 n. 2, March/April 1999, p. 20+, LN.

Both sides now run the risk of drift and even paralysis in transatlantic trade policy -- with potentially severe repercussions for the rest of the world. A slide into protectionism or even a failure to continue opening new markets would have a major impact on the global trading system. Could we then expect Asian economies, who depend on expanded exports to emerge from their deep recessions, to keep their own markets open? Would the transition economies in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia stick to their liberalization strategies? With the backlash against globalization already evident everywhere, the ominous inward-looking protectionist and nationalistic policies that the world has rejected so decisively could reemerge once again. A failure of transatlantic leadership would make such policy reversals particularly likely. The United States and the EU are the only economic superpowers and the only two regions enjoying reasonable economic growth. They created the GATT system and, more recently, the WTO. Despite their own occasional transgressions, they have nurtured and defended the system throughout its evolution over the past 50 years. While Japan has been important on a few issues and the developing countries played an encouraging role in the Uruguay Round, the Atlantic powers built and sustained the world trade order. Their failure to maintain that commitment would devastate the entire regime.

#### Great power war

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### US-EU relations prevent Iran prolif

Peterson et Al. 9/11/**13** [John Peterson - Chair of International Politics at the University of Edinburgh, Riccardo Alcaro - IAI's Transatlantic Programme, Riccardo Alcaro is co-coordinator of the 7th Framework Programme-funded Transworld project on the future of the transatlantic relationship and its role in the world; he is responsible for the organization of the annual Transatlantic Security Symposium on the security priorities debated by the transatlantic partners. He is a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies, and Nathalie Tocci - Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, “MULTIPOLARITY AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: Multilateralism and Leadership in a New International Order”, P. 15-18, Accessed: 9/17/13]

Above all, the NTA has helped the transatlantic relationship keep pace with the emergence of Brussels as a political capital. The Brussels-Washington “channel” in transatlantic relations has gained in importance in past decades over others, including NATO and the various bilateral channels between Washington and national European capitals (including London and Berlin). US officials or commentators concerned with individual policy sectors or areas of the world are exceptions to the rule about American ignorance of the EU. To illustrate, analysts of the politics of Iran’s nuclear programme concede that “[t]he Europeans have been the unsung heroes in pressing Iran with their embargo on the import of Iranian oil” (Middle East Institute 2012). The embargo caused genuine pain to southern EU member states already in serious economic difficulties. But it also ratcheted up the pressure on Teheran – posing genuine economic hardship on Iran – in a way that made the West seem like a collective. On the economic front, trade specialists and economists regularly acknowledge the importance of the Union both as the world’s largest trading power and by far America’s most important economic partner (see Hamilton and Quinlan 2013). Toje (2008: 144) notes that “American decision-makers do take the European Union very seriously in matters of trade and economy.” An exemplary instance was the 2011 NTA summit that yielded an agreement to create a bilateral High Level Working on Jobs and Growth to tackle an ambitious cooperative economic policy agenda. There is sufficient “low-hanging fruit” in the form of economic gains for both sides to justify an ambitious US-EU economic cooperation agreement. Two separate studies suggested that greater gains for the US were available from a US-EU deal than from the Trans-Pacific Partnership it was pursuing in Asia (see Stokes 2013). Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address featured clear investment of political will in the initiative from the highest political level: “tonight I am announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union – because trade that is free and fair across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” Hence, the institutions that bind the West together appear relatively robust. Moreover, new forces in the emerging international order can be interpreted, plausibly, as pushing the US and EU towards each other. One is the rise of China. The Obama administration’s “Asian pivot” signalled a fundamental shift in America’s geopolitical focus towards Asia and away from Europe. Collective transatlantic action on China will inevitably face obstacles as the US and Europe each try to curry favour with China and seek access to its fast-growing markets. But both Washington and European national capitals – not least Brussels – share an interest in encouraging Beijing to settle disputes with other Asian capitals over islands and territory in the region peacefully and, above all, to become a responsible international economic actor. Another change that, on balance, may encourage collective transatlantic action is Russia’s emergence as a “pole.” European reliance on Russian energy supplies makes confrontation a decidedly unappealing option for most EU member states, which are naturally inclined to seek some form of modus vivendi with their difficult neighbour (David et al. 2013). The US has no such concerns and is therefore less restrained in criticizing Moscow for its poor human rights record or signalling that Georgia and Ukraine might become NATO members, as the Bush administration did (recklessly), provoking deep resentment in the Kremlin. Yet, the US has its own interest in engaging Russia in ways that make it a responsible geopolitical player in its near abroad and something like a normal trading power as a WTO member. A perhaps less obvious source of common transatlantic cause is the rise of India. The incentives for the US and Europe jointly to encourage New Delhi to be a help and not a hindrance on all things “AfPak” (Afghanistan and Pakistan) are clear. Only slightly less so is shared motivation to prod India – a country where trade ministers are garlanded when they return home from a WTO summit after scuppering a deal – towards wielding its economic power in ways that are not cynical and self-centred, as well as to develop its way out of its grinding poverty. At the same time, forces exist that strain the West. There is no question that Europe – leaving aside the euro crisis – has slid down the list of American geopolitical priorities. The EU and Europe more generally remain underappreciated allies in Washington. The US Republican party often finds a convenient epithet for Obama’s economic policies by describing them as “European.” Consider Mitt Romney’s contentions that Obama “takes his cues from the Social Democrats of Europe” in turning America into a “European-style welfare state and entitlement society,” or Newt Gingrich’s that the President’s goal was a “European socialist state.” The Eurozone crisis, the intense interpenetration of the US and EU in each other’s economies, and the widespread perception that America’s post-2008 economic recovery was stymied in large part by developments in Europe inevitably led many in Washington to view Europe as more a burden than a strategic partner. A broader question is whether the US and Europe are drifting apart in their views of what constitutes a “good society.” New questions arose during the post-2008 recession about the ability of the American economy to sustain an upwardly mobile middle class amidst rising inequality and stubborn unemployment. With a spiralling, crippling public debt, there was little appetite in either major US party to adopt a more European-style role for the state. Sachs (2012) notes very little difference between Democrats and Republicans in terms of their view of the role of the state: Paul Ryan’s (as Romney’s Vice-Presidential candidate) budgetary proposals called for public budget outlays of 19.7 per cent of GDP in 2016 and 19.5 per cent in 2020. Meanwhile, the Obama administration proposed 19.1 per cent in 2016 and 19.7 per cent in 2020. Total US government revenues (at all levels of government) stand at about 32 per cent of GDP. In the EU, the comparable figure is 44 per cent. Other less tangible but still powerful forces also push towards drift and perhaps even fracture. One is a basic lack of American understanding of how Europe is organized politically. Even thoughtful US scholars such as Kupchan (2012: 153) misinterpret the EU by concluding (for example) that the failure of the Union’s Constitutional Treaty led ‘instead [to] drafting a dramatically scaled-down version known as the Lisbon Treaty’. By any account, Lisbon is mostly identical to the Constitutional Treaty without its constitutional trappings about an EU flag, anthem, and so on. Thinking longer term, it is perhaps more germane to the future of transatlantic relations to think that the real problem will be that European policy – including foreign policy – will become more EU-based in the decades to come while the Union struggles to command legitimacy, attention and understanding in the US. No opinion poll to our knowledge has ever shown that a majority of Americans has even heard of the EU. Meanwhile, recent polling data show that the percentage of Americans who think that Europe is the most important area of the world to the US fell from 50 per cent in 1993 to 37 per cent in 2011. Those judging that Asia was most important rose from 31 per cent to 47 per cent (PEW 2011). Having considered the forces that both push Europe and America together, and those that threaten to pull them apart, we find no conclusive evidence of either partnership or a bipolar West. Yet, on balance, the transition towards a more multipolar order heightens the incentives they confront to make common cause, particular on their bilateral economic agenda but also in managing the rise of emerging powers. We consider below what kind of collective transatlantic action might be possible and to what ends. A leading observer of contemporary IR concedes that the greatest challenge of the next decades is “establishing legitimate authority for concerted international action on behalf of the global community… at a time when old relations of authority are eroding” (Ikenberry 2011: 6). Insofar as a shift towards multipolarity creates a “crisis,” it is one of legitimacy and authority. Ikenberry (2011: 5) resorts to liberal institutionalist logic to insist that it is a crisis “within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order…[it is] not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” Clearly, the commitment of several of the BRIC countries to “deep liberal principles” and, by extension, an international order for which they provide a foundation is questionable. At the same time, the age’s most pressing international problems – nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, economic stagnation, global warming and so on – demand not only collective governance but also leadership to give it political impulse. Whether or not we accept Ikenberry’s account, the West can secure its leadership status in any future international order only if it provides such an impulse. Inevitably, its leadershipcapacity will atrophy if Europe and America seek to lead using traditional means. In a rapidly changing environment, a “status quo leadership” aimed mainly at preserving the existing institutional architecture and distribution of power is politically toxic. Assertive leadership that seeks to impose solutions cooked up in Washington or European capitals – or between them – will prove less effective than participatory and inclusive governance. Solving the “crisis of governance” means providing new opportunities for the involvement of various types and constellations of actors in different policy sectors. What is needed is some form of what Burns (1978), in his classic work, termed “transformational leadership.” As the name implies, transformational leadership seeks transformation, often of institutions or rules. Leadership that seeks reform is a more sophisticated exercise than leadership that seeks to play by accepted rules in the pursuit of long-established goals. It embraces not only norm- and agenda-setting, but also – perhaps above all – coalition- and capacity-building. In practical terms, it must drive and shape, but not dictate, the reform of global governance. How to exert such transformational leadership is complicated. The “smart power” notion that combines hard and soft power (Nye 2008) provides a useful, but vague guiding principle whose implementation may take quite different forms in different policy fields. But its essence is combining the hard power of coercion with the soft power of persuasion. The US and Europe possess different kinds of hard power. America is capable of more coercion while the EU has resources – in the form of trade privileges or aid, but also sanctions – that make collective action (at least) possible even on hard security issues such as Iran. Yet, combining hard power with the power to persuade is extremely taxing for the transatlantic partners. Both must, first, coax collective action out of their highly compartmentalized governmental structures. Second, they must – ideally – combine resources and agree on productive divisions of labour (see Lindstrom 2005). Third, they must make the case for international action to publics whose appetite for international activism is, by recent measures, declining.

#### A nuclear Iran results in instability and results in ineffective deterrence

Kroenig and McNally ’13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)djm

But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015—Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war**.**

#### US-EU relations solve nuclear war

John S. Duffield 94, analyst, “NATO’s Functions After the Cold War,” POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY v. 109 n. 5, Winter 1994, pp. 753-787, ASP.

Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe - as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies - remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.(11)

# 2ac

## T-its

#### Belonging to or associated with

Oxford Dictionary 10 (“Of”, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)

Pronunciation:/ɪts/

possessive determiner

belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified:turn the camera on its side he chose the area for its atmosphere

## Counterplan

#### US inviting both Canada and Mexico solves

Moody 3/13/13 – (Glyn, “Mexico Will Ask To Join US-EU Transatlantic Trade Agreement”, Tech Dirt, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130313/10181122311/mexico-will-ask-to-join-us-eu-transatlantic-trade-agreement.shtml)//javi

That suggests that the US is actively involved in this latest move -- maybe even its instigator -- and would look favorably on Mexico joining TAFTA. There's also a hint in the article quoted above that Canada too might join TAFTA. Having both Mexico and Canada on board would be consistent with the US's past approach, where it allowed them to join the TPP negotiations, but on fairly humiliating terms that limit their scope of action.

#### Mexico only wants to join as a response to the Canada EU deal

Trew 3/18/13 – trade campaigner for the Council of Canadians (Stuart, “With French PM in town, Canada commits to EU trade deal 'this year'”, Rabble, http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/council-canadians/2013/03/french-pm-town-canada-commits-eu-trade-deal-year)//javi

So when should we expect a Canada-EU trade deal to be ready? At some point this year seems to be the closest guess, though one frequent CETA commentator wonders if even that is possible. Meanwhile the Mexican government appears to have requested participation in the fledgling U.S.-EU negotiations toward a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), with hints that Canada could also be welcomed aboard by the Obama administration.

### 2ac – US Civil War

**Mexican instability spills over to the US, sparking civil war.**

Steven **David 99**, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis

CONFLICTS FOUGHT within the borders of a single state send shock waves far beyond their frontiers. To begin with, internal wars risk destroying assets the United States needs. Were the Persian Gulf oil fields destroyed in a Saudi civil war, the American economy (and those of the rest of the developed world) would suffer severely. Internal wars can also unleash threats that stable governments formerly held in check. As central governments weaken and fall, weapons of mass destruction may fall into the hands of rogue leaders or anti-American factions. More directly, internal wars endanger American citizens living and traveling abroad. Liberia will not be the last place America sends helicopters to rescue its stranded citizens. Finally, internal wars, when they erupt on U.S. borders, threaten to destabilize America itself. U.S. intervention in Haiti was spurred, in large part, by fear of the flood of refugees poised to enter the United States. All of these dangers are grave enough to warrant consideration; what makes them even more serious is the fact that their impact on America is largely unintended. Being unintended, the spill-off effects of civil wars are not easily deterred, which creates unique challenges to American interests. U.S. policymakers have traditionally tried to sway foreign leaders through a simple formula: ensure that the benefits of defying America are outweighed by the punishment that the United States will inflict if defied. That calculus, however, no longer applies when there is no single, rational government in place to deter. This raises the cost to America; if the United States (or any country) cannot deter a threat, it must turn to actual self-defense or preemption instead. Unlike deterrence, these strategies are enormously difficult to carry out and in some cases (such as preventing the destruction of the Saudi oil fields) would be impossible. Without deterrence as a policy option, Washington loses its most effective means of safeguarding its interests. Where are these new threats likely to crop up? And which should the United States be concerned with? Two criteria must guide policymakers in answering these questions. First is the actual likelihood of civil war in any particular state. American interests would be endangered by a war in Canada, but the prospect is so improbable it can safely be ignored. Second is the impact of a civil war on the United States; would it threaten vital American security and economic concerns? Future conflict in Sierra Leone may be plausible, but it would have such a negligible impact on the United States that it does not justify much attention. Only three countries, in fact, meet both criteria: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Civil conflict in Mexico would produce waves of disorder that would spill into the United States, endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, destroying a valuable export market, and sending a torrent of refugees northward. A rebe8llion in Saudi Arabia could destroy its ability to export oil, the oil on which the industrialized world depends. And internal war in Russia could devastate Europe and trigger the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, civil war in a cluster of other states could seriously harm American interests. These countries include Indonesia, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and China. In none, however, are the stakes as high or the threat of war as imminent. BREAKING MEXICO'S HABIT MEXICO TODAY faces a future more uncertain than at any other point in its modern history. Pervasive corruption financed by drug traffickers, the end of one-party rule, armed revolt, and economic disaster have all surfaced over the past few years. In response, the Mexican army has begun to question its decades-old record of non-interference in politics. Should Mexico collapse into chaos, even for a short period of time, vital American interests will be endangered. This, in turn, raises the specter of U.S. intervention. The growing influence of drug money is the greatest single source of Mexican instability. The narcotics industry has worked its way into the fabric of Mexican society, to the extent that it is now Mexico's largest hard currency source (estimated at $ 30 billion per year) and is probably the country's largest employer. As in Colombia, drug dealers threaten to take control of the state. More worrying, senior Mexican officials -- including those in charge of the antidrug effort -- are routinely found to be working for drug cartels. Major drug traffickers have assembled their own private armies and operate without fear of prosecution. Crime, much of it drug financed, runs rampant throughout the country, particularly in Mexico City. In 1995, then-CIA director John Deutch signaled his concern for the impact of drugs on Mexico by making that country a strategic intelligence priority for the first time. It may, however, already be too late for help from Washington. The control of Mexico by drug traffickers will be hard to reverse, especially since, given the central role the drug lords play in Mexican life, doing so might further destabilize the country. The Mexican economy provides a second source of civil conflict. The country still has not recovered from its 1994 economic crisis, when the devaluation of the peso sparked fear of total financial collapse. Disaster was averted by the extraordinary intervention of the United States and the International Monetary Fund, which provided a $ 50 billion bailout. Despite this assistance, inflation climbed to 52 percent (up from 7 percent the year before), real earnings dropped by as much as 12 percent, the GDP shrank 6 percent, and over 25 percent of Mexicans fell seriously behind in debt repayment. Though conditions have improved slightly in the years since, the basic problems that caused the devaluation in the first place remain -- such as reliance on foreign investment to finance growth. These problems, combined with crushing Mexican poverty (85 percent of Mexicans are either unemployed or not earning a living wage), falling oil prices, and the widening gap between the prosperous north and the impoverished south, together form the basis for future unrest. Ironically, the advent of true democracy has further threatened Mexican stability. For 70 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party ruled the nominally democratic country as a private fiefdom. The PRI made all key decisions and chose all important officials (including the president) while suppressing meaningful dissent. The monopoly ended in 1997, however, when the PRI lost its majority in the lower house of parliament to two competing political parties. The Conservative Party (PAN) now threatens the PRI in the more prosperous north while the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) has gained support among poor southerners, students, and intellectuals, and has won the key post of mayor of Mexico City. The fall of the PRI may enhance stability in the long term, as oppressed groups see their demands addressed for the first time. But the transition itself will be dangerous; states in the process of democratizing are far more vulnerable to civil conflict than are mature democracies or authoritarian regimes. As opposition parties declare their intent to expose the PRI's corrupt and criminal history, the order which Mexico has enjoyed for 70 years will be the first casualty of the new freedom. As if to illustrate the potential for disorder, major armed uprisings have once again erupted. Mexico has suffered a long tradition of regional warfare, dating back to its earliest days of independence. After decades of peace, this threat reemerged in the mid-1990s, and now endangers the stability of the state. In January 1994, some 4,000 "Zapatista" rebels, fearful of losing their land, seized seven towns in the southern state of Chiapas. Though they were poorly armed, the support they received throughout Mexico and the army's inability to quell their revolt starkly demonstrated the weakness of the Mexican government. That weakness grew even more pronounced when it was revealed that the government had turned to paramilitary groups to suppress the rebels. One such group massacred 45 civilians in December 1997, sparking widespread protest and investigations of government complicity. Meanwhile, the less well known but potentially more dangerous People's Revolutionary Army (EPR) launched a rebellion in 1996 by attacking military and economic targets in six southern states. Unlike the Zapatistas, the EPR openly seeks to overthrow the current regime. While its prospects of doing so may be remote, the EPR's very existence drives a thorn into the government's side. Amidst these struggles, the Mexican military may abandon its long tradition of noninvolvement in politics. Since the 1980s, the government has called on the military to suppress drug-related violence within the country. This use of the military for domestic purposes drew it directly into political disputes it had shied from in the past, and risked spreading corruption within the ranks. Meanwhile, the end of the PRI's monopoly on power may further destabilize the armed forces. For the first time in their history, the troops face an institutionally divided leadership. The military might split into rival political factions, especially if opposition parties are prevented from exercising power. Conflict in Mexico threatens a wide range of core American interests. A civil war would endanger the 350,000 Americans live south of the border who. Direct American investments of at least $ 50 billion would be threatened, as would $ 156 billion in bilateral trade and a major source of petroleum exports. Illegal immigrants would swarm across the 2,000-mile frontier, fleeing civil conflict. And armed incursions might follow; during the Mexican Revolution of 1910, fighting spilled over the border often enough that the United States had to deploy roughly half its armed forces to contain the conflict. In a future war, the millions of Americans with family in Mexico might take sides in the fighting, sparking violence within the United States.

**Extinction**

James **Pinkerton 03**, fellow at the New America Foundation, , Freedom and Survival, p. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2003/freedom\_and\_survival

Historically, the only way that the slow bureaucratic creep of government is reversed is through revolution or war. And that could happen. But there's a problem: the next American revolution won't be fought with muskets. It could well be waged with proliferated wonder-weapons. That is, about the time that American yeopersons decide to resist the encroachment of the United Nations, or the European Union—or the United States government—the level of destructive power in a future conflict could remove the choice expressed by Patrick Henry in his ringing cry, "Give me liberty, or give me death." The next big war could kill everybody, free and unfree alike.

### Space

### 2ac- Space

#### Plan is key to Florida Econ

McGurgan 9/25- Kevin, Tampa Bay Times, (“Column: Free trade's boost for Florida”, September 25, 2013 http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-free-trades-boost-for-florida/2143880\\CLans)

Realizing this, the United States and the European Union, the group of trading nations of which the United Kingdom is a leading member, have negotiated a deal to reduce or remove as many barriers as possible. The first round of negotiations has already taken place, and we hope to reach agreement within the next 18 months. We are calling it the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP for short. The United States and the EU are the two largest economies in the world, with a combined value of around $30 trillion. U.S.-EU trade is worth $2.5 billion every day, one third of all world trade, and it's increasing all the time. A million jobs in the United States depend on trade with Britain alone. They tend to be good, well-paid jobs, with salaries above the U.S. average. So we always knew that the boost to our economies from freeing up trade was going to be large. What we didn't know, until recently, was how each individual state would benefit. Now the results are in. A September 2013 study by the British Embassy in Washington, Bertelsmann Foundation and the Atlantic Council finds that TTIP could add more than 740,000 jobs to the U.S. economy as a whole — that's the equivalent of the entire working population of West Virginia. The average American household would stand to gain around $865 every year as a result of lower prices and higher average wages. You can find the study, which was just released, online at www.gov.uk and tinyurl.com/tbtimes-UK. But what does this mean for Florida, already one of the most pro-free trade states in the union? Florida already exports $6.1 billion worth of goods and $9.3 billion worth of services to the EU. The predictions are good. The study projects that a U.S.-EU trade deal could add as many as 47,540 jobs to the Florida job market and boost Florida's exports to Europe by 26.9 percent. Many of those export gains will be realized in aerospace, transportation and chemicals, while the largest job increases should be seen in business and financial services. I believe that's good news for the Tampa Bay area and Florida as a whole. Tampa is already home to major British companies such as BAE Systems, British Airways World Cargo and the medical device company of Smith and Nephew. The strategic investments you are making in ports, infrastructure, workforce and research at quality universities such as the University of South Florida, aligned with this trade deal, will continue to make Tampa Bay an attractive and competitive place to invest in and do business with. Beyond the economics, the study also represents a key strategic opportunity for the United States and the EU. As a diplomat who has spent one-third of his career living in the United States, I believe that an ambitious game-changing agreement has the potential to send a powerful message to the rest of the world regarding the trans-Atlantic commitment to global rules and standards in international trade. These numbers show that free trade is not just an idea. It has real benefits, both for business and for hard-working people. And that's why Floridians, and all Americans, should be excited about this deal.

#### That’s key to effective space missions

Kinsey 12- Troy, Report for WCTV News Agency (“Florida's Space Industry Struggles to Survive” http://www.wctv.tv/news/headlines/Floridas\_Space\_Industry\_Struggles\_to\_Survive\_149179995.html\\CLans)

For 50 years, it's been a critical part of Florida's economy. But now our space industry is struggling to survive. The retirement of the shuttle program has left thousands of workers jobless. And, it's also called into question whether Florida's days as America's pre-eminent space state are over. After 30 years and more than 130 missions, the space shuttle program has disappeared into history. And now the talent, technology and patriotism that helped drive it may be in jeopardy of disappearing, too. Tim pickens works at dynetics, a NASA contractor in Huntsville, Alabama. He's committed to reviving Florida's space industry, not least because his company depends on it. Now that manned missions launching from Cape Canaveral are no more...He says it'll be up to a handful of private space flight companies to help inspire a national movement. "People are going to say, 'NASA, what's the vision? Where are we going?' and then, they need to be looking at air breathing technology, you know, hypersonics, and you know, 'how do i get my ride from New York to LA In 15 minutes?' Pickens says only the government can pioneer that kind of technology, and if enough people ask for it, Washington will pay for it. But, there's no guarantee manned launches will return to Florida. That's why Farrukh Alvi spearheads a research hub aimed at using space technology in other ways. "I suspect that Florida will not be the only one that's going to be launching things - Texas, New Mexico and others. But, you need to have a more diverse economy, so even if it's very successful, you do not want to just invest in there - you need to diversify." Areas like green energy and biotech - they could be a big part of america's economic future. And, in the end, blasting off from Texas and New Mexico may not be possible...Because of Florida.

#### Extinction is inevitable – laundry list – deep-space exploration key to solve

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Viability and Preservation.¶The all-or-nothing benefit of space exploration is the long-term survivalof the human race; although the extended timeframe of this benefit makes it very hard to quantify.We know that our life on Earth is finite, but the preservation benefit of sustained civilization outside of the Earth could range from enormous to miniscule depending on whether viability of human life on Earth ends in <1 thousand years or >1 billion years. There is a long list of potential calamities that could end human civilization, including asteroid/comet, super-virus, excess volcanism, socioeconomic collapse,environmental changes, weapons of mass destruction, ormaybe something we’ve never envisioned. Some of these initiating events can be mitigated or prevented as a result ofspace exploration; most notablythe ability to deflect or destroy a potential extinction causing asteroid or comet. The ability to deflect an asteroid could actually be developed within a decadeusing existing technology, the question is would we have enough warning time to successfully develop and deploy it. Space exploration could also uncover currentlyunknown threats, such as looming changes in the behavior of the sun, or maybe astronomical threats such as nearby black holes,supernovae, darkmatter, orsomething our current understanding of physics is not aware of.¶The ultimate defense against human extinctionwould be to establish permanent, self-sustaining colonies of humans beyond the Earth. The path to this type of existence does not require a huge leap in science and technology; most engineers agree that abundant, reliable energy (probably nuclear) isthe key to expanding into space. In the near term (decades) exploration could focus on where and how to develop sustainable communities away from the earth, includingquasi-sustainable outposts on the moon and Mars. In the mid-term (centuries) sustainable outposts could be created on Mars, Titan, asteroids, etc. that could beconsidered planetary lifeboats, as a safeguard against major calamities that could end human civilization. In the long term (millennia), the concept of the “planetary lifeboat” could transform to a “celestial Mayflower”, taking us to new worlds outside of our solar system. The benefits of this scenario are not limited to merely saving the human race.Even if humanity continues to thrive on Earth, there would be the possibility for a nearly unlimited number of humans to experience existence (in addition to the increased population that Earth could support by importing resources) and expand the extent of human condition (e.g. well-being, knowledge, and enlightenment). If new opportunities and experiences emerge, people will migrate to them, just as they did to the New World ~500 years ago.¶

### 2ac – biotech

#### Trade catalyzes biotech innovation — that spreads globally and establishes an international model

SDD 7 — San Diego Dialogue, a division of University of California San Diego Extension, contributing to the advancement of research, relationships and solutions to the San Diego-Baja California crossborder region's long-term challenges in innovation, economy, health and education. As a part of the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), Division of Extended Studies and Public Programs, the Dialogue is an entirely self-funded public policy organization (San Diego Dialogue, *Crossborder Group Inc.*, June 2007, “Borderless Biotech & Mexico’s Emerging Life Sciences Industry”, <http://www.sandiegodialogue.org/pdfs/Borderless_Biotech.pdf>, Accessed 07-26-2013 | AK)

This document is yet another part of a continuing effort to describe Mexico’s evolution in technology and science. Clearly, certain intriguing crossborder opportunities appear to exist in the case of life sciences – whether in ag-biotech, biocontrols, genomics research, pharmaceutical manufacturing, medical devices, or clinical trials. While all of Mexico cannot expect to immediately become a world-leader in all areas of this sector, its history already shows examples of regional genius and connections with California’s biotech and pharmaceutical industries. The question remains: can this history be expanded upon - and will it include San Diego? Given that San Diego has the largest concentration of US-based biotechnology firms along the US-Mexico border and one of the largest in the United States, there is a strong case and a unique opportunity to work with the dynamic regions that make up Mexico’s emerging life sciences industry. Direct flights from both San Diego’s or Tijuana’s airports to these regions provides access that few other locations in the United States can take advantage of. The broad use of English by many of Mexico’s technology leaders eliminates yet another barrier to increased interaction, scientific collaboration, and possibly investment. Such an opportunity, first discussed in Borderless Innovation, can help act as a catalyst for both increasing multi-regional competitiveness in life science companies, as well as accelerate Mexico’s growth in this sector. Just as the strength of a helix is based on the connections between its components, so too the potential for San Diego to become both a portal and a partner for Mexico's emerging life sciences regions creates opportunities for each side of the crossborder region. Joining together the talent and capabilities of San Diego, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Nuevo León, and Baja California in the development of a life sciences partnership may create a unique, international model that goes beyond borders. Ultimately, such a partnership might also extend to many other regions – in the US, Mexico, Canada, Europe and Asia – supporting new job growth, new discoveries, and a world of borderless biotech.

#### Biotech is dual-use--deters nuclear and biological warfare

Carafano and Gudgel 7

(James Jay, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security. Andrew, freelance writer. “

Many of biotechnology's benefits are dual-use, increasing the possibility that knowledge, skills, and equipment could be adapted for use as biological weap­ons. As the global biotechnology industry expands, the U.S. government should therefore increase its capacity to exploit biotech advances for national security. The challenge of exploiting cutting-edge biotech­nology will be different from the way the Pentagon harnessed science and technology for national security during the Cold War. Rather than driving the biotech­nology revolution, the federal government will need to figure out how best to utilize and adapt the prod­ucts developed by a multibillion-dollar transnational industry that already has the money and capacity for research and development. To keep up, the federal government must adopt legislative, policy, and organizational innovations. These should include promoting international liability protection for developing and deploying new national security goods and services, promoting scientific travel and exchanges, and assigning a lead agency to coordinate biotechnology exploitation for national security. From There to Here Biotechnology refers to any technological appli­cation that uses living organisms to make or modify products for explicit use, specifically through DNA recombination and tissue culture. Gregor Mendel first described the role of genes through his research on "dominant and recessive factors" in the 1860s. By the 1940s, scientists were aware of DNA, and James Watson, Francis Crick, and Rosalind Frank­lin modeled its structure in the 1950s. In 1970, the discovery of enzymes, which break apart and connect snippets of DNA, allowed for the creation of genetically modified organisms. This bore fruit by the early 1980s, when scientists myn­aged to genetically modify bacteria to produce humyn insulin, which is now the principal source of insulin for diabetics.[1] Recently, major advances in information technol­ogies have led to the development of bioinformat­ics.[2] Bioinformatics focused initially on creating and storing biological and genetic information, most notably in the Humyn Genome Project. Scientists are now combining this information into a compre­hensive picture, enabling researchers to study how different diseases alter these activities. Combining advances in genomics and information technology has significantly enhanced the industry's capability to bring new products to the marketplace. Many of the advancements in biotechnology are dual-use. The technology that may revolution­ize medical care by providing faster-acting and more effective drugs could also be used to field more lethal biological weapons. Thus, federal agen­cies have a clear imperative not only to exploit the advantages of new developments, but also to anticipate and prepare countermeasures for how potential adversaries might exploit these medical advances. Current Research Much of the current biotech research focuses on agent detection, vaccines, and treatment. Scientists are studying the immune systems of primitive organ­isms, such as jawless fish, to garner greater under­standing of the humyn immune system and to develop new antibody therapies.[3] They are also studying how diseases infect and affect humyn cells. For example, recent research indicates that the fam­ily of bacteria that includes bubonic plague blocks immune system responses using a protein related to one naturally found in humyns.[4] Scientists are also investigating ways to create vaccines that work against whole classes of disease-causing organisms and to boost the humyn immune system in general.[5] Research is also underway to counter the rise of multidrug-resistant bacteria. Scientists are investi­gating the use of bacteriophages, which are viruses that prey on bacteria, as a means to fight infectious disease. Ironically, research on bacteriophages began in the early 20th century but declined after the discovery of antibiotics. In the summer of 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the use of a bacteriophage preparation on meat as an anti-microbial agent against Lysteria bacteria.[6] Better vaccines and treatments could provide permynent immunity to all "classic" biological agents or at least reduce their lethality to a consid­erable degree. In October 2006, the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology announced the develop­ment of microscopic pumps that would allow rapid testing of blood and other fluids by pumping them into a "lab on a chip," which would detect biological or chemical agents.[7] Argonne National Laboratory is also developing its own biochip detection technology.[8] This "lab on a chip" research points to the feasibility of rapid bio­logical agent detection, allowing individuals to know whether they have been exposed within minutes rather than days. It may even be possible to develop implantable biosensor chips that would continu­ously monitor for exposure to biological agents.[9] The Future of Biotechnology Future advances in biotechnology will continue to improve the protection of both the general public and military personnel from deadly biological agents. The creation of broad-spectrum vaccines may give the public health community the ability to vaccinate the country's entire population against both endemic diseases and biological weapons. A bioweapon inoculation may someday be as com­mon as other childhood vaccinations. Besides disease detection and vaccines, biotech­nology has numerous other potential applications. The military is exploring the use of biomimicry, which uses natural biological systems or material as an inspiration for solving engineering problems. For example: In 2002, scientists discovered how geckos stick themselves to smooth surfaces using van der Waal's forces-the weak natural attraction between atoms-and were then able to re-create the surface of a gecko's foot artificially.[10] The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is researching devices that mimic geckos' use of van der Waals force to enable soldiers to climb buildings without ropes or ladders.[11] Scientists are also researching spider silk and abalone shell to create stronger, lighter armor for personnel and vehicles. Other projects include developing organic solar cells and a new generation of sensors and optics derived from biological and silicon-based systems.[12] The next great step in biotechnology is proteom­ics: the direct mynipulation and construction of proteins. While DNA instructs cellular mechanisms in how to operate, proteins do the actual work inside and outside of cells. Proteins are found in everything from papayas to snake venom. Because protein structure and composition is much more complex than DNA, protein analysis is much more difficult and time-consuming. However, under­standing how proteins are constructed and how they behave promises to be as great an advance in biological science as understanding DNA was in the 20th century. If advances in biotechnology continue, con­structing a completely artificial organism from the "ground up"-creating synthetic DNA and proteins from raw materials and then combining them to form living cells-may be possible in the not too distant future. National Security and Biotechnology The challenge for the federal government is to figure out how to leverage cutting-edge biotechnol­ogy for national security purposes. Before 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) was the primary arm of the federal government in funding biological defense and research related to national security. The DOD research program focused primarily on the battlefield uses of biotechnology. The events of 9/11 and the post-9/11 anthrax let­ters shifted the focus to the American people's vul­nerability to biological threats. In many respects, the DOD research was not directly applicable to other biodefense national security needs. For exam­ple, DOD immunization programs assume that the individuals to be immunized will be generally healthy and young. On the other hand, immuniza­tions for a general population in the event of biolog­ical weapons attack would have to consider the effects of vaccines on old and young people and on individuals with medical conditions who might have weakened or compromised immune systems and react very differently to a vaccine developed by the military. To apply research to broader national security concerns, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) under the Department of Health and Humyn Ser­vices (HHS) received the bulk of increased funding for developing biodefense measures.[13] In recent years, in addition to HHS and DOD, many other fed­eral agencies have initiated biotechnology research related to national security, including the recently established Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While much of the research in DOD, HHS, and other federal entities involves detecting, protect­ing against, and mitigating biological attacks and pandemics, it also involves other products related to national security, including humyn performynce enhancement (such as reducing the effects of stress and fatigue) and battlefield medical treatment. There is a plethora of ongoing programs. The Pentagon has considerable experience and capacity for medical research and development of products related to national security, but this is vir­tually a new mission for the NIH, which historically has focused on basic scientific research.[14] The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Dis­eases has unique research facilities and expertise in biowarfare defense. On the other hand, the DOD's record with respect to developing and producing vaccines has engendered significant controversy. The post-9/11 expansion of the government application of biotechnology to national security has not been matched by organizational innova­tions to manage and integrate programs more effec­tively. DOD, DHS, and NIH research programs are not routinely coordinated, and NIH policies pro­hibit funding other federal institutions. Thus, NIH programs cannot utilize DOD scientists who may have valuable knowledge and experience relevant to NIH national security research. In some cases, government-sponsored research duplicates other programs, and opportunities for complementary research programs are missed.[15] Enlisting the Private Sector Harnessing the vast capabilities of the private sector has proven similarly challenging. Compared to potential commercial buyers, the government is a modest-sized customer for biotech firms. There are also other issues. After 9/11, insurance skyrocketed for technologies developed for homeland security. While the demand for new security technologies has swelled, companies must weigh the pressure to rush new products to the marketplace against their liability risks. In 2002, Congress enacted the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act[16] to encourage companies to con­tinue researching and developing biotechnologies vital to homeland security. The act protects compa­nies from litigation if their products fail during a ter­rorist attack or are harmfully employed by terrorists. The DHS has shown some success in implementing the legislation and granting SAFETY Act protections to goods and services that are employed to prevent or respond to terrorist threats. However, companies do not enjoy similar protec­tions from other countries when the technologies are deployed outside the United States or adopted by U.S. friends and allies. The government also has a mixed record in encouraging the private sector to develop new national security capabilities. In 2004, the President announced the implementation of Project Bioshield to accelerate research on and development, pur­chase, and availability of effective medical counter­measures against biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents. The program provided $6 bil­lion over the next 10 years to private companies for research and development of next-generation coun­termeasures against anthrax, smallpox, and other infectious agents and antidotes against chemical and radiological threats. To date, the effort has yielded meager results.[17] The response to 9/11 has introduced another dif­ficulty in advancing biotechnology research in the United States. After the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the United States imposed a number of additional requirements on visa issuance and monitoring to thwart travel by terrorists. These measures included more rigorous registration and monitoring of foreign graduate students, myndatory interviews of all overseas visa applicants, and requiring visa holders to return to their countries of origin to renew their visas. These measures have had unintended conse­quences, including deterring top graduate students from coming to the United States, making scientific exchanges more difficult, and even prompting com­panies and academic and scientific associations to move meetings, conferences, and research facilities outside of the United States. As a result, the United States has become less competitive in many key sci­entific areas, including biotechnology.[18] Moving Forward The United States has no room for complacency. Without better policies, programs, and manage­ment, it risks losing its competitive advantage in exploiting biotechnology for national security. Con­gress and the Administration should act to set the right conditions for the government to adopt com­mercial biotechnology developments. Specifically, they should: Restructure national security biotechnology programs. While increased funding has trans­formed it into the leading federal agency in bio­security research, the NIH is inexperienced and unproven in its ability to develop products. Like­wise, the DHS has yet to demonstrate that it can produce cutting-edge biotechnology advances. Conversely, the DOD has significant experience and skills in developing biodefense countermeasures. To the maximum extent possible, research pro­grams should be consolidated under a single agency. Where consolidation is not practical, a more effective management structure is needed to leverage the advice and expertise in different agencies in support of NIH programs.[19] Encourage other countries to adopt SAFETY Act protections. While the SAFETY Act has been successfully implemented in the United States, it does not protect companies from litiga­tion abroad. Consequently, companies that oper­ate outside of the United States have shied away from contributing to biosecurity because of the potential risks. The Administration should develop a strategy to encourage other countries to adapt similar pro­tections. The U.S. strategy should take a regional approach, beginning with the European Union and Japan. Reform visa issuance and management. U.S. national security and competitiveness rely heavily on people's ability to travel to the United States, but the current visa system is unnecessarily depriving the United States of many of the world's best and brightest scientists, students, and entre­preneurs. Long wait times for personal interviews are among the most frequently cited factors that make travel to the United States difficult. Congress should remove the requirement for per­sonal interviews of virtually all non-immigration visa applicants and restore the Secretary of State's ability to waive personal interview requirements. The U.S. should begin using electronic visa appli­cations to reduce applicants' travel expenses and should reduce processing times to 30 days or less. All of these reforms can be implemented in a mynner that makes international travel both more convenient and more secure.[20] Making the Nation Safer Dual-use biotechnologies developed in the pri­vate sector offer powerful tools to protect Americans from biological threats and to increase the military's operational capabilities. Congress and the Adminis­tration should not only be aware of this growing field, but also act to ensure that the private sector- which is making the largest investment in basic research and product development-remains com­petitive. Specifically, the U.S. government should streamline the federal government's capability to fund and adapt new technologies, work to expand litigation protection beyond the country's borders, and further reform U.S. visa issuance and monitor­ing programs.

## Security

### 2ac – framework

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

### 2ac – biopolitics turn

**Their K creates a world without political enmity – creates a terrifying system without an exterior – enemies re-appear in internalized struggles – that causes worse biopolitical violence**

**Prozorov 06** /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/ [Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the ‘most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed. Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the 3: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’.49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world

### 2ac – security good – pragmatism

#### Foreign policy should be guided by a mix of moral and self-interested motivations – the alt’s absolutism causes paralysis and incoherence that creates more violence

George Friedman - founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of Stratfor – 12/6/11, Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111205-egypt-and-idealist-realist-debate-us-foreign-policy?utm\_source=freelist-f&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=20111206&utm\_term=gweekly&utm\_content=readmore&elq=88a5097c3a284763b9202918890c5a91

Western countries, following the principles of the French Revolution, have two core beliefs. The first is the concept of national self-determination, the idea that all nations (and what the term “nation” means is complex in itself) have the right to determine for themselves the type of government they wish. The second is the idea of human rights, which are defined in several documents but are all built around the basic values of individual rights, particularly the right not only to participate in politics but also to be free in your private life from government intrusion. The first principle leads to the idea of the democratic foundations of the state. The second leads to the idea that the state must be limited in its power in certain ways and the individual must be free to pursue his own life in his own way within a framework of law limited by the principles of liberal democracy. The core assumption within this is that a democratic polity will yield a liberal constitution. This assumes that the majority of the citizens, left to their own devices, will favor the Enlightenment’s definition of human rights. This assumption is simple, but its application is tremendously complex. In the end, the premise of the Western project is that national self-determination, expressed through free elections, will create and sustain constitutional democracies. It is interesting to note that human rights activists and neoconservatives, who on the surface are ideologically opposed, actually share this core belief. Both believe that democracy and human rights flow from the same source and that creating democratic regimes will create human rights. The neoconservatives believe outside military intervention might be an efficient agent for this. Human rights groups oppose this, preferring to organize and underwrite democratic movements and use measures such as sanctions and courts to compel oppressive regimes to cede power. But they share common ground on this point as well. Both groups believe that outside intervention is needed to facilitate the emergence of an oppressed public naturally inclined toward democracy and human rights. This, then, yields a theory of foreign policy in which the underlying strategic principle must not only support existing constitutional democracies but also bring power to bear to weaken oppressive regimes and free the people to choose to build the kind of regimes that reflect the values of the European Enlightenment. Complex Questions and Choices The case of Egypt raises an interesting and obvious question regardless of how it all turns out. What if there are democratic elections and the people choose a regime that violates the principles of Western human rights? What happens if, after tremendous Western effort to force democratic elections, the electorate chooses to reject Western values and pursue a very different direction — for example, one that regards Western values as morally reprehensible and aims to make war against them? One obvious example of this is Adolf Hitler, whose ascent to power was fully in keeping with the processes of the Weimar Republic — a democratic regime — and whose clearly stated intention was to supersede that regime with one that was popular (there is little doubt that the Nazi regime had vast public support), opposed to constitutionalism in the democratic sense and hostile to constitutional democracy in other countries. The idea that the destruction of repressive regimes opens the door for democratic elections that will not result in another repressive regime, at least by Western standards, assumes that all societies find Western values admirable and want to emulate them. This is sometimes the case, but the general assertion is a form of narcissism in the West that assumes that all reasonable people, freed from oppression, would wish to emulate us. At this moment in history, the obvious counterargument rests in some, but not all, Islamist movements. We do not know that the Islamist groups in Egypt will be successful, and we do not know what ideologies they will pursue, but they are Islamists and their views of man and moral nature are different from those of the European Enlightenment. Islamists have a principled disagreement with the West on a wide range of issues, from the relation of the individual to the community to the distinction between the public and private sphere. They oppose the Egyptian military regime not only because it limits individual freedom but also because it violates their understanding of the regime’s moral purpose. The Islamists have a different and superior view of moral political life, just as Western constitutional democracies see their own values as superior. The collision between the doctrine of national self-determination and the Western notion of human rights is not an abstract question but an extremely practical one for Europe and the United States. Egypt is the largest Arab country and one of the major centers of Islamic life. Since 1952, it has had a secular and military-run government. Since 1973, it has had a pro-Western government. At a time when the United States is trying to end its wars in the Islamic world (along with its NATO partners, in the case of Afghanistan), and with relations with Iran already poor and getting worse, the democratic transformation of Egypt into a radical Islamic regime would shift the balance of power in the region wildly. This raises questions regarding the type of regime Egypt has, whether it is democratically elected and whether it respects human rights. Then there is the question of how this new regime might affect the United States and other countries. The same can be said, for example, about Syria, where an oppressive regime is resisting a movement that some in the West regard as democratic. It may be, but its moral principles might be anathema to the West. At the same time, the old repressive regime might be unpopular but more in the interests of the West. Then pose this scenario: Assume there is a choice between a repressive, undemocratic regime that is in the interests of a Western country and a regime that is democratic but repressive by Western standards and hostile to those interests. Which is preferable, and what steps should be taken? These are blindingly complex questions that some observers — the realists as opposed to the idealists — say not only are unanswerable but also undermine the ability to pursue national interests without in any way improving the moral character of the world. In other words, you are choosing between two types of repression from a Western point of view and there is no preference. Therefore, a country like the United States should ignore the moral question altogether and focus on a simpler question, and one that’s answerable: the national interest. Egypt is an excellent place to point out the tension within U.S. foreign policy between idealists, who argue that pursuing Enlightenment principles is in the national interest, and realists, who argue that the pursuit of principles is very different from their attainment. You can wind up with regimes that are neither just nor protective of American interests. In other words, the United States can wind up with a regime hostile to the United States and oppressive by American standards. Far from a moral improvement, this would be a practical disaster. Mission and Power There is a temptation to accept the realist argument. Its weakness is that its definition of the national interest is never clear. The physical protection of the United States is obviously an issue — and given 9/11, it is not a trivial matter. At the same time, the physical safety of the United States is not always at stake. What exactly is our interest in Egypt, and does it matter to us whether it is pro-American? There are answers to this but not always obvious ones, and the realists frequently have trouble defining the national interest. Even if we accept the idea that the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy is securing the national interest irrespective of moral considerations, what exactly is the national interest? It seems to me that two principles emerge. The first is that having no principles beyond “interest” is untenable. Interest seems very tough-minded, but it is really a vapid concept when you drill into it. The second principle is that there can be no moral good without power. Proclaiming a principle without having the power to pursue it is a form of narcissism. You know you are doing no good, but talking about it makes you feel superior. Interest is not enough, and morality without power is mere talk. So what is to be done about Egypt? The first thing is to recognize that little can be done, not because it would be morally impermissible but because, practically, Egypt is a big country that is hard to influence, and meddling and failing is worse than doing nothing at all. Second, it must be understood that Egypt matters and the outcome of this affair, given the past decade, is not a matter to which the United States can afford to be indifferent. An American strategy on Egypt — one that goes beyond policy papers in Washington — is hard to define. But a number of points can be deduced from this exercise. First, it is essential to not create myths. The myth of the Egyptian revolution was that it was going to create a constitutional democracy like Western democracies. That simply wasn’t the issue on the table. The issue was between the military regime and an Islamist regime. This brings us to the second point, which is that sometimes, in confronting two different forms of repression, the issue is to select the one that is most in the national interest. This will force you to define the national interest, to a salutary effect. Washington, like all capitals, likes policies and hates political philosophy. The policies frequently fail to come to grips with reality because the policymakers don’t grasp the philosophical implications. The contradiction inherent in the human rights and the neoconservative approach is one thing, but the inability of the realists to define with rigor what the national interest is creates policy papers of monumental insignificance. Both sides create polemics as a substitute for thought. It’s in places like Egypt where this reality is driven home. One side really believed that Egypt would become like Minnesota. The other side knew it wouldn’t and devised a plan to be tough-minded — but not tough-minded enough to define what the point of the plan was. This is the crisis of U.S. foreign policy. It has always been there, but given American power, it is one that creates global instability. One part of the American regime wants to be just; the other part wants to be tough. Neither realizes that such a distinction is the root of the problem. Look at the American (and European) policy toward Egypt and I think you can see the predicament.

### 2ac – alt fails – intervention

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

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The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

### 2ac – threats real

#### Literature and psychological bias runs towards threat deflation- we are the opposite of paranoid

**Schweller 04** [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

## Politics

### 1nc – generic

#### No disease impact

Keller 13 -- Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder (Rebecca, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

Periodic media reports of bird flu, a new SARS-like virus and a case of drug-resistant tuberculosis have kept the world informed, but they have also contributed to a distorted perception of the true threat such contagions pose. Perhaps the greatest value of the media coverage is the opportunity it provides to discuss the uncertainties and the best ways to prepare for biological threats, both natural and man-made. It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

### Long beach thumper

#### Thumpers – Guns, health care, food stamps

Epstein 9/21

Jennifer, “Obama vows to continue gun-law push”, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obama-vows-to-continue-gun-law-push-97162.html#ixzz2fdmCaK1y>, CMR

President Barack Obama vowed Saturday to keep pushing ahead on his domestic agenda, fighting for tougher gun laws and resisting Republican efforts to cut funding for health care and food stamps.¶ “We fought a good fight earlier this year, but we came up short and that means we’ve gotta get back up and go back at it” to put in place new gun laws, Obama told the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation’s annual dinner in Washington, in a combative speech aimed squarely at firing up a key part of his base.¶ “We can’t rest until all of our children can go to school or walk down the street free from the fear that they will be struck down by a stray bullet,” he said. “Just two days ago in my hometown, Chicago, 13 people were shot during a pickup basketball game, including a three-year-old girl.”¶ On Sunday, Obama will meet with the families of victims of the Navy Yard shooting, who “now know the same unspeakable grief [as] families in Newtown and Aurora and Tucson and Chicago and New Orleans and all across the country,” he said.¶ They’re “people whose loved ones were torn from them without headlines sometimes and public outcry, but it’s happening every single day,” Obama continued, later adding: “As long as there are those who fight to make it as easy as possible for dangerous people to get their hands on a gun, then we’ve got to work as hard as possible for the sake of our children. We’ve got to be ones who are willing to do more work to make it harder.”¶ Obama’s speech signaled that he may be willing to expend political capital on gun laws in the coming months. Before that, though, he must reach a deal with Republicans to avert a government shutdown on Oct. 1, and to raise the debt ceiling by later this fall.

### 2ac – link non-unique

#### Link has been triggered – Obama announced the plan

Feldmyn 8/9/13 – (Elliot, “United States: TPP, TTIP, And Congress: The Elephant In The Room”, Mondaq, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/257058/international+trade+investment/TPP+TTIP+And+Congress+The+Elephant+In+The+Room)

The Washington trade policy community is buzzing over the two largest international trade negotiations since the effective collapse of the Doha multilateral trade round. The buzz may be even louder in foreign capitals. The Obama Administration, in mid-July, was still promising to complete the Trans Pacific Partnership ("TPP") negotiations by year-end, while starting up the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") negotiations with similar speedy objectives. For both deals there is engagement and enthusiasm. Inside U.S. Trade, the trade community's weekly Bible, devoted over thirty pages, all but one article in a recent edition, to these negotiations.

### 2ac – no link – TTIP

#### No link – trade doesn’t face opposition

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate.

### 2ac – Link Turn – Bipart

#### The plan is bipartisan- no backlash and different from other trade agreements

Schott and Cimino 13- Jeffrey J. is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, joined the Institute in 1983. Cathleen Cimino has been research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 2012

To be sure, disagreements over these issues have confounded transatlantic officials for almost two decades. One of the reasons for past failures has been that negotiators tried to break down barriers in a piecemeal fashion. Attempts to achieve limited “mutual recognition” deals on specific products or sectors foundered because of strong resistance from independent regulatory agencies pressing their own agendas in response to political pressures. Trying to reach a more comprehensive deal offers the oportunity to garner sufficient political support to off set those political obstacles. Indeed, Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, emphasized this point in a recent Financial Times op-ed, noting that “any bilateral trade and investment agreement must be comprehensive and address the full range of barriers to US goods and services if it is to receive broad, bipartisan congressional support.” 4 One way to avoid past mistakes and indeed to overcome the understandable skepticism of many would be for the two sides to learn from the success of several recent comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)—most notably the accords that the European Union and the United States each have with South Korea. These two agreements successfully liberalized trade and investment in goods and services in a manner that shows a path to success for the TTIP, which as we discuss below, is essentially what the HLWG has recommended. If the United States and the European Union follow this path, they could achieve a transatlantic accord in the next few years that both contributes to stronger economic growth and establishes a 21st century rulebook for trade that can provide a benchmark for new regional and multilateral trade agreements.

### Won’t Pass

#### Won’t Pass, Boehner Pushing and his PC fails

Ignatius 9/27 (David, The Washington Post, “No following this leader” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-john-boehner-is-a-leader-without-followers/2013/09/27/c8145b2a-2705-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9\_story.html)

We are seeing the consequences of a leaderless House in the GOP’s renewed threat of a government shutdown or debt-ceiling default. These reckless actions are part of a grandstand play to reverse the Affordable Care Act, more parts of which begin to take effect in October, but they’ve assumed an illogic of their own. The House Republicans seem almost to enjoy holding the country hostage. Their version of Russian roulette has become so familiar that we forget just how outrageous it is. Boehner surely knows this course is folly. Legislation to defund Obamacare won’t pass Congress. And the GOP’s brinkmanship, however popular with the right wing, is damaging the party nationally. Boehner this week struggled to find an alternative strategy — to avoid a shutdown by delaying Obamacare a year, or by attaching the defunding plan to the debt-ceiling extension. Both were seriously bad ideas, but even these extreme proposals were rejected by his caucus. Boehner declared his impotence during a July 21 interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” Moderator Bob Schieffer asked him to express support for the comprehensive immigration bill he had earlier said he favored. “If I come out and say I’m for this and I’m for that, all I’m doing is making my job harder,” answered Boehner. “This is not about me,” he said several times, as if abdication of control were some kind of virtue. A dumbfounded Schieffer responded: “That is kind of an interesting take on leadership, though. In other words, you don’t see yourself as someone who has an agenda. You’re there to just sort of manage whatever your people want to do?” House Republican sources tell me that Cantor has cunningly worked to undermine his nominal boss. By often allying himself with the roughly 40 tea party extremists who refuse any compromise with Obama, Cantor gives them political oxygen. He encourages their showboating, as on the bill he championed this month to slash the food-stamp program. Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.), chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee, described this bill as “a monumental waste of time.” House committee chairmen ignore Boehner; they know Cantor is the guy with the knife. This dysfunction isn’t built into the system. It’s a result of human failure. President Obama gets pummeled daily for his weak leadership but, compared with Boehner, he’s a titan.

### Bill Bundling

#### Bill bundling decks any passage- wont be separated

Schreiner 9/17/13

“In Budget Faceoff, Obama Warns of 'Economic Chaos'” Associated Press writer Bruce Schreiner, The Associated Press Sep 17th 2013, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/09/17/federal-budget-faceoff-obama-warns-gop-economic-chaos/

Conservative Republicans, on the other hand, say the health care law, which has yet to take full effect, will place a burden on businesses and the public and will damage the economy. As a result, they insist that it be starved of taxpayer money or at least delayed.¶ Chances are fading for a complicated GOP leadership plan that would allow the House to also vote to "defund Obamacare" but automatically separate the measures when delivering them to the Senate to ease the way for quick passage of a "clean" funding measure for delivery to Obama.¶ The next steps aren't clear, but one option under consideration is to accede to conservatives' demands to deliver to the Democratic Senate a combined bill that pays for government and defunds the health care law. The Senate would be virtually certain to strip away the attack on the health care law and bounce the funding measure right back to the House.

### PC Not Key

#### GOP obstructionism makes spillover arguments literally irrelevant

Greg Sargent, Washington Post, 9/17/13, The big story this fall will be the divisions within the GOP, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/17/the-big-story-this-fall-will-be-the-divisions-within-the-gop/

Syria will have precisely zero effect on domestic fights over the budget and the debt ceiling. The whole idea is preposterous, and I think everyone knows it. The Republican gridlock freight train has been on track for months and it hasn’t budged an inch since spring. Syria hasn’t had the slightest impact on this.¶ Well, yes, but “everyone” does not “know this.” High profile pundits such as Albert Hunt and Stuart Rothenberg have both suggested Obama’s standing is taking such a hit from the Syria crisis that it could impair his ability to handle domestic politics. Ruth Marcus claims Obama is so diminished that it could have repercussions in the debt limit and government shutdown fights.¶ The only way to sustain this belief is to ignore the reality of what’s happened for the last five years. The notion that Obama’s “standing” will impact the GOP posture towards him is just deeply strange. How could Republicans be any more intransigent towards Obama than they already have been, short of pursuing impeachment?¶ Even a casual glance at what’s happening right now among Republicans — see Jonathan Strong and Robert Costa for good inside views — should be enough to remind anyone that the only thing that will really matter to the outcomes this fall is whether Republicans can resolve their deep internal differences, chiefly over how aggressively to confront Obamacare. Right now, GOP leaders themselves want to pass a measure funding the government — and plainly want to raise the debt ceiling as well. But they can’t see any way to getting that done, even at current austerity levels, solely because conservatives are insisting that they use these things to stage an Apocalyptic confrontation to defund Obamacare. Obama’s standing is utterly irrelevant to any of that.¶ This isn’t to say Obama’s approval rating doesn’t matter at all, or that Obama’s handling of Syria hasn’t been problematic in many ways. It has. But the notion that this will impact his ability to wrest a deal funding the government or raising the debt limit from Republicans seems like an outgrowth of a larger inability — widely shared among commentators — to reckon with the ways in which the current political situation is highly unconventional. GOP obstructionism of Obama’s agenda has in many ways been unprecedented, and the party’s conservative wing is both asymmetrically radical while wielding outsized control over the party, thanks in part to GOP lawmakers’ fear of primary challenges and other structural factors. The main storyline this fall will turn on whether GOP leaders can figure out a way to overcome this, now that it has veered out of their control. Not much else matters.¶ It’s conceivable that if Obama’s approval rating drops it could embolden conservatives in Congress to argue even more vehemently that GOP leaders mustn’t cave to his demands in the government shutdown and debt limit fights. But come on — conservatives are currently demanding that the GOP leadership threaten to unleash economic chaos to force Obama to unilaterally agree to unwind his signature domestic accomplishment, after trying but failing to repeal it dozens of times. To imagine that this could get any worse requires ignoring what’s currently happening all around us. The big story that will shape our overarching political situation in the near future remains the GOP’s internal differences — and the question of whether Republicans will figure out how to resolve them.

### PC Fails

#### PC fails

-won’t negotiate

-won’t push a bill

-too adversarial

-Boehner alienation

Reuters 9/15/13

“Obama will deal on budget, not on debt limit: ABC interview” Mark Felsenthal, Sun Sep 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/15/us-usa-fiscal-obama-idUSBRE98E08W20130915

With a possible government shutdown looming in two weeks, and the threat of a U.S. debt default as early as mid-October, Obama said on ABC's "This Week with George Stephanopoulos" that it is up to lawmakers to work out a budget.¶ He insisted the budget should contain enough spending to help support economic growth and said he will not allow Republicans to attach conditions to raising the $16.7 trillion U.S. borrowing cap.¶ "We've presented our budget," Obama said. "Now it's the job of Congress to come up with a budget that keeps our long-term trends of ... reducing the deficit moving forward, but also allows us to invest in the things we need to grow."¶ Obama said trading cuts to his signature healthcare program in exchange for an increase in the nation's borrowing limit is not an option. "What I haven't been willing to negotiate, and will not negotiate, is on the debt ceiling," he said.¶ With the crisis over Syria off the boil, Washington faces yet another fiscal showdown. Most government operations will cease on October 1 unless Congress passes a budget the president will accept and the United States risks a debt default as early as mid-October if lawmakers delay raising the borrowing cap.¶ Obama and the Republican-led House of Representatives remain at loggerheads over both the budget and the debt limit. Republican lawmakers have sought to make defunding the president's signature healthcare law, the Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare, a condition for raising the cap.¶ Obama's administration has delayed implementing such steps as signing final agreements with insurance plans to be sold on federal health insurance exchanges as it struggled to get the law's provisions in place before enrollment opens on October 1.¶ "This administration has already delayed or waived fully a third of this legislation and we believe it is only fair for the American people now to have that same delay and that's the proposal I believe will be coming forward this week," Republican Representative Tom Price of Georgia said on "Fox News Sunday."¶ Democratic Representative Chris Van Hollen said on the same program that legislation mandating delays in putting the law in place would stand in the way of making health insurance affordable to many Americans and is "not acceptable."¶ "WAYS OF DOING THIS"¶ Lawmakers last week considered extending government funding at current $988 billion levels until mid-December, but Tea Party Republicans insisted that cuts to Obamacare remain part of the package.¶ Obama will mark the five-year anniversary of the U.S. financial crisis on Monday in an effort to move back to his domestic agenda after weeks of dealing with Syria and how to respond to its use of chemical weapons. The financial crisis was accelerated on September 15, 2008, when the Lehman Brothers firm filed for bankruptcy protection.¶ Obama is expected to focus on the positive, discussing progress made and highlighting his prescriptions for boosting job creation amid budget battles with Republicans.¶ He said he would be willing to talk to House Speaker John Boehner about reversing deep across-the-board spending cuts that went into effect this year through the process known as sequestration, but said Boehner has been an unwilling partner.¶ "There are ways of doing this. It's just that they haven't been willing to negotiate in a serious way on that," Obama said.

### No Impact

#### Err aff---their authors exaggerate

Tom Raum 11, AP, “Record $14 trillion-plus debt weighs on Congress”, Jan 15, <http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_17108333?source=rss&nclick_check=1>

Democrats have use doomsday rhetoric about a looming government shutdown and comparing the U.S. plight to financial crises in Greece and Portugal. It's all a bit of a stretch. "We can't do as the Gingrich crowd did a few years ago, close the government," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), referring to government shutdowns in 1995 when Georgia Republican Newt Gingrich was House speaker. But those shutdowns had nothing to do with the debt limit. They were caused by failure of Congress to appropriate funds to keep federal agencies running. And there are many temporary ways around the debt limit. Hitting it does not automatically mean a default on existing debt. It only stops the government from new borrowing, forcing it to rely on other ways to finance its activities. In a 1995 debt-limit crisis, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin borrowed $60 billion from federal pension funds to keep the government going. It wasn't popular, but it helped get the job done. A decade earlier, James Baker, President Ronald Reagan's treasury secretary, delayed payments to the Civil Service and Social Security trust funds and used other bookkeeping tricks to keep money in the federal till. Baker and Rubin "found money in pockets no one knew existed before," said former congressional budget analyst Stanley Collender. Collender, author of "Guide to the Federal Budget," cites a slew of other things the government can do to delay a crisis. They include leasing out government-owned properties, "the federal equivalent of renting out a room in your home," or slowing down payments to government contractors. Now partner-director of Qorvis Communications, a Washington consulting firm, Collender said such stopgap measures buy the White House time to resist GOP pressure for concessions. "My guess is they can go months after the debt ceiling is not raised and still be able to come up with the cash they need. But at some point, it will catch up," and raising the debt limit will become an imperative, he suggested.

#### Treasury fills in – causing debt to decline now

Lefkin 13

[Peter, Senior Vice President of Government and External Affairs for Allianz of North America, “Round 2 of the Debt-Ceiling Debate,” Allianz Global, 5/21, <http://us.allianzgi.com/Commentary/MarketInsights/Pages/5QuestionswithPeterLefkin.aspx>]

The May 19 debt-ceiling deadline wasn’t all that eventful because, true to form, Congress once again kicked the can down the road. We’re probably not going to see any movement until after the summer. For now, the national debt is declining: The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the deficit this year will be $642 billion, more than $200 billion less than it expected three months ago. With higher revenue, the United States will be able to take steps to stave off the $16.4 trillion debt limit until September, and maybe even later if Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae continue to make money and bring the Treasury additional revenue. The Treasury Department is using some of the traditional tools in its arsenal to meet liabilities such as postponing pension-reserve payments, suspending government bond sales and deploying an array of accounting gimmicks It’s also tapping. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailout reimbursements. There’s new revenue coming in from higher taxes, Fannie and Freddie and the spending cuts triggered by the sequester. But it isn’t that much money in the grand scheme of things. Half of the $85 billion under sequestration was never going to be spent. And the $60 billion in tax revenue from upper-income individuals under the fiscal-cliff legislation was equal to the amount earmarked for Superstorm Sandy relief efforts. It’s relatively insignificant in the context of the bigger deficit problem.

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## Topicality

#### “Toward” is a direction, not a result

Oliver 7 – Dennis Oliver, ESL and Developmental English Teacher, “Prepositions: Using "To" and & "Toward" for Places”, Dave’s ESL Café, http://www.eslcafe.com/grammar/prepositions07.html

The preposition to is another common preposition of place. It is normally used with a verb showing movement and shows the result of the movement-- the place or person that the movement was toward or in the direction of. The preposition toward has a similar meaning, but it's not exactly the same: with toward, the direction of the movement is shown, but not the result.

#### Choice of “toward” is intentional --- reject their unpredictable interpretation

Ector 1879 – P.J. Ector, Judge in the Court of Appeals of Texas, “H. H. Hudson v. The State”, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 565; 1879 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 143, Lexis

Mr. Webster, in his Unabridged Dictionary, gives "toward," when used as a preposition, the following meaning, to wit: "Toward--1. In the direction to. 2. With direction to; in a moral sense, with regard to, regarding. [\*576] 3. With ideal tendency to. 4. Nearly." If the Legislature had intended that such insulting words must be used by the deceased to or in the presence of the female, in order to reduce the killing to mynslaughter, [\*\*18] some other word than "towards," and one that would have better expressed the idea, would have been used in the statute. It appears clear to us that, on the plainest principles of justice and reason, it could make no difference, so far as the provocation is concerned in this instance, whether the deceased told the wife of the defendant that she was a prostitute, or her husband that he had married a prostitute. The extent of the transport of passion, to extenuate the guilt of the homicide, would be as great in the one case as in the other. And in every case when such a defence is relied on to reduce the killing to mynslaughter, the jury must be at liberty to determine whether, under all the circumstances, the insulting words were the real cause which provoked the killing. The court did not err in overruling defendant's motion in arrest of judgment.